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 Denmark and Turkey’s EU Accession:  
Between therapy and rejection 
Dietrich Jung 
After the constitutional referendum on September 12, 2010, the public debate 
about Turkey’s EU accession has gotten new momentum. The essay is looking 
at some of the particular patterns that have previously characterized this de-
bate in Denmark. It briefly analyzes the positions of Denmark’s political and 
economic establishments, as well as, the broader public debate. The analysis 
shows that, so far, the Danish debate on Turkey’s EU membership aspirations 
has been characterized by rhetoric of both “therapy” and “rejection”. 
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    he EU will always find an excuse!” So was the reaction of the barber Hüseyin 
Özan in Copenhagen on the critical remarks with which Mogens Lykketoft, a 
leading member of Denmark’s Social Democrats and previous minister of for-
eign affairs, warned against Turkey’s accession to the EU (Politiken, 10. Nov. 
2002). In the fall of 2002, Lykketoft joint the choir of voices that vociferously 
argued against Turkish membership before the EU enlargement summit in Co-
penhagen and expressed what actually many of his Danish colleagues thought. 
This negative attitude toward Turkish membership was in striking contradic-
tion to the overwhelming support which the EU enlargement process in general 
enjoyed among Danish politicians. It was not enlargement as such, but the ac-
cession of Turkey against which Lykketoft came out. Apparently, Turkey’s can-
didacy has a very peculiar status in Danish politics and it is knitted into both 
political discourses on the EU and the public debate about migration and Islam. 
In which ways is Turkey’s EU accession perceived in Denmark? How is the po-
litical and economic elite framing this perception? Why does Denmark’s desire 
for enlargement not comprise Turkey? 
Since joining the European Community in 1972, a large part of the Danish 
population has retained its skeptical stance toward an ever closer union. This 
ingrained political skepticism is perfectly demonstrated by the four EU opt-
outs: Copenhagen does not participate in common defense policies, in the eco-
nomic and monetary union, in juridical cooperation besides the inter-
governmental level, and it maintains a unilateral declaration on EU citizenship. 
These opt-outs address core issues of the traditionally perceived sovereignty of 
the national state and reflect deep concerns among large parts of Danish citi-
zens. However, this does not mean that Danes do not really want to be a part of 
the EU. There are also strong concerns to lose touch with core EU develop-
ments. Danish EU skepticism is accompanied by anxieties to become isolated 
and a sincere desire for enhanced economic cooperation. Hence, the Danish atti-
tude toward European integration is ambivalent and the mood of the popula-
tion tends to shift with respect to questions of economic versus political integra-
tion. Danish EU policies are conducted within this context of ambivalent atti-
tudes to the EU project and it is important for the political elite not to give the 
impression to make any major EU policy decisions without consulting the peo-
ple. This applies also to the issue of Turkey’s EU membership. 
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Looking at the political parties, a clear majority of Danish parties expresses 
lukewarm support for Turkey’s EU membership based on the strict condition-
ality of the Copenhagen Criteria. Thereby, most parties view Turkey’s EU ac-
cession in a one-dimensional way: it is Turkey as an applicant who wants to 
join a beneficial club and Brussels should carefully ensure the country’s fulfill-
ment of European standards before joining the EU. Only Det Radikale Venstre 
discusses Turkish membership in its official statements as possibly beneficial 
for both the applicant and the EU. In the eyes of Denmark’s political establish-
ment, Turkey is an EU candidate with still questionable democratic credentials 
and a relatively feeble human rights record. This negative political image of the 
country is additionally framed within cultural stereotypes according to which 
Turkey with its predominantly Muslim population is imagined as a Middle 
Eastern rather than a European country. 
This negative image of Turkey is not shared by Denmark’s business elite. In 
official statements, Turkey is presented as a dynamic economy with a fast grow-
ing private sector and high potentials for the future. In 2004, Dansk Industri (DI) 
published a report Tyrkiet på vej! (Turkey on the way) which aimed at informing 
its members and the Danish public about the perspectives and opportunities 
associated with Turkey’s EU accession. In his preface, the then director of DI, 
Hans Skov Christensen, called the question of Turkey’s EU membership the 
second biggest issue after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the name of DI, he de-
clared that without any doubt, Turkey, like the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, should be invited to join the EU. Denmark’s business sector often calls 
Turkey a “tiger economy” and puts its emphasis on integration. Not a cultural 
gap, but an increasing economic integration into the European market charac-
terizes the perceptions of Turkey in business circles. From an economic perspec-
tive, Turkey is in particular a promising and still underdeveloped market for 
Danish entrepreneurs. 
Moving to the broader public debate it becomes apparent that many politi-
cians position themselves more critically vis-à-vis Turkey than it is expressed by 
their officially documented party lines. In general, this debate is characterized 
by the assumption that Turkey is not really able to live up to the Copenhagen 
Criteria. Danish observers apply the standards of the Scandinavian role model, 
and their critical stance toward Turkey is in line with the general suspicion that 
European integration causes a threat to the democratic credentials of this 
model. In this way, the contemporary debate on Turkish EU membership is still 
characterized by the perceptions that made Denmark itself a reluctant EU 
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member. This is particularly apparent with regard to two political issues in 
which Turkey played a central role: the EU’s decision to partly stop the acces-
sion negotiations with Turkey because of Ankara’s non-compromising attitude 
toward Cyprus, and the question of freedom of speech that was raised, for in-
stance, under the Muhammad cartoon crisis which shook Denmark in 
2005/2006. 
In December 2006, Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to traffic 
from Cyprus led to the suspension of negotiation talks between Brussels and 
Ankara in eight out of the 35 chapters of the acquis communitaire. In this quarrel 
between Turkey and the EU, the Danish Prime Minister first joined the camp of 
the EU hardliners (Cyprus, Greece, France and Austria) who called for a stop of 
the accession negotiations. Before the Luxembourg summit, Anders Fogh Ras-
mussen (Venstre) said that he wants to keep Turkey on the European track, 
however, only in giving Ankara a clear and ultimate signal; and the Danish 
Prime Minister added: “It is Turkey that has to adjust itself to the EU and not 
the other way round”! (Politiken, 29. November 2006). In a similar way, the 
leader of the Social Democrats, Helle Thorning-Schmidt reacted to the Cyprus 
crisis. In joining sides with the Prime Minister, she supported the idea of France 
and Germany to give Turkey an ultimatum of 18 months to sort out its prob-
lems with Cyprus. Also Thorning-Schmidt emphasized that it is in Europe’s 
own interest to work together with Turkey, but the EU’s rules apply to all and 
there is no room for Ankara to make its own rules (Politiken, 5. December 2006). 
Apparently, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Helle Thorning-Schmidt felt the 
pressure of public opinion. Even more important, they had to react to Dansk 
Folkeparti’s suggestion to stop the accession negotiations with Turkey entirely 
and to give up the idea of Turkish membership in the EU. The then DF speaker 
on EU politics, Morten Messerschmidt, interpreted the discussion to stop the 
negotiations because of the Cyprus conflict as a first step toward the under-
standing that Turkey will never be able to live up to European standards 
(Politiken, 29. November 2006). Only Henriette Søltoft, head of the section for 
European affairs at Dansk Industri, criticized this emphasis on the Cyprus con-
flict in the public debate. In her opinion this discussion completely overshad-
owed the ongoing process of positive reforms which has nevertheless been tak-
ing place in Turkey (Børsen 13 December 2006). Eventually, the Danish gov-
ernment supported the suggestion of the EU Commission to stop the negotia-
tions only with regard to eight chapters of the acquis and to continue the rest of 
the accession process. 
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 In September 2005, the Danish daily Jyllandsposten published a series of car-
toons about the Prophet Muhammad. What most probably was meant to be a 
provocation of Danish Muslims soon turned into a political crisis with a global 
dimension. One factor which triggered the internationalization of the cartoon 
crisis was the decision of Prime Minister Rasmussen in fall 2005 to reject the 
request of 11 ambassadors from Muslim states – Turkey among them – to meet 
with him and to discuss the issue. In the eyes of the then Danish Prime Minis-
ter, this meeting would have been a violation of the principle of freedom of 
speech. The fact that the Turkish ambassador participated in this request let 
Prime Minister Rasmussen to give a stern warning to Ankara. In his under-
standing Turkey joined the wrong side in this controversy. Aspiring full-
membership in the EU means to fully accept the principle of freedom of speech. 
Rasmussen continued that if the Turkish ambassador’s protest expresses An-
kara’s attitude toward this fundamental principle, then Turkey would risk a 
straight “no” to its EU membership-bid (Berlingske, 25. October 2005). 
Generally speaking, Danish public opinion reacts extremely sensitive to any 
restrictions of civil liberties. Therefore, incidents such as the Muhammad car-
toon crisis, Ankara’s demand to close down the Kurdish TV-station Roj TV that 
is broadcasting from Denmark, or the trial against the literature Nobel Prize 
award winner Orhan Pamuk figure prominently in the public debate. To be 
sure, these cases clearly show that Turkey indeed has problems to comply with 
the political standards of the Copenhagen Criteria. However, the continuing 
focus on these democratic deficits by politicians and public opinion-makers 
emphasizes the shortcomings in Turkey’s reform process at the expense of its 
many achievements. 
While the Danish government maintains Turkey’s formal right to be consid-
ered a candidate for full-membership in the EU, in the public debate some of its 
leading representatives give the impression that they neither believe nor want 
to believe in Ankara’s ability to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. Therefore, it 
does not come as a surprise that public support for Turkish membership is low 
and that the demand of Dansk Folkeparti to hold a referendum on Turkey’s ac-
cession – although rejected by leading politicians of all other parties – finds 
resonance not only among the voters of DF.  
Summing up, the country’s public debate is stuck in a circular discourse 
about Turkey’s ability to democratize. While supporters approach this question 
in a “therapeutic way” – “We have to help them and to treat their democratic 
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deficits, otherwise they will never be able to enjoy living in a democratic society 
with a functioning market economy” – opponents often base their arguments to 
reject Turkish membership on religious and cultural grounds. To a certain ex-
tent, the arguments of both sides seem to be rooted in the Danish self-
confidence of representing a superior role-model of the democratic welfare-
state. The debate, therefore, partly reflects previous discussions about Den-
mark’s membership in the European Community. Under the political hegem-
ony of the Social Democrats, the European Community was viewed as a con-
servative power: too Catholic, too capitalist, and dominated by Christian De-
mocrats. However, while in the 1960s the question was whether Denmark has 
to sacrifice its democratic achievements in joining the European Community, 
today it is Turkey’s possible accession that allegedly threatens the democratic 
and social achievements of the EU.  
Looking at the major stake holders in the public debate about Turkey, only 
Denmark’s business community and politicians associated with the security 
community break with this circular discourse and also point to the possible 
benefits which the EU could achieve by Turkey’s EU membership. Generally 
speaking, the Danish debate moves within the formal framework given by 
Brussels, but it puts its focus almost entirely on the democratic deficits of the 
country and the reluctance of its political elite to live up to the norms of liberal 
democracy. On closer examination, the observer can detect a certain mismatch 
between the official statements of Denmark’s political elite and the way in 
which many Danish politicians argue in the public debate. This mismatch might 
be behind the barber Hüseyin Özan’s comment on Lykketoft that in the end the 
politicians will find an excuse for not granting Turkey full membership. Al-
though Denmark’s political establishment continues to reject the idea to hold a 
referendum on Turkish membership, eventually such a referendum could pre-
cisely be the excuse Hüseyin Özan meant; an excuse which even could be given 
in the name of popular democracy. 
